Inequality, Finance and Pro-Poor Investment in Africa by Asongu, Simplice & Tchamyou, Vanessa
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Inequality, Finance and Pro-Poor
Investment in Africa
Simplice Asongu and Vanessa Tchamyou
December 2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/71171/
MPRA Paper No. 71171, posted 8 May 2016 07:16 UTC
 1 
 
AFRICAN GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 
INSTITUTE 
 
 
 
 
A G D I   Working Paper 
 
 
WP/15/052 
 
 
Inequality, Finance and Pro-Poor Investment in Africa  
 
  
 
Simplice  A. Asongu
a 
 & Vanessa S. Tchamyou
ab 
 
a
African Governance and Development Institute, 
P. O. Box 8413, Yaoundé, Cameroon 
E-mails: asongus@afridev.org /  simenvanessa@afridev.org 
 
b 
University of Liège, HEC-Management School, 
Rue Louvrex 14, Bldg. N1, B-4000 Liège, Belgium 
E-mail: vsimen@doct.ulg.ac.be 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
2015 African Governance and Development Institute                                                   WP/15/052 
 
 
AGDI Working Paper 
 
Research Department  
 
Inequality, Finance and Pro-Poor Investment in Africa  
 
Simplice A. Asongu
 
 & Vanessa S. Tchamyou
 
 
December 2015 
 
 
Abstract  
 
This study complements existing literature by investigating how investment-driven finance 
affects inequality in Africa. The empirical evidence is based on restricted and unrestricted Two-
Stage Least Squares and a pre-crisis periodicity (1980-2002). Inequality is measured with 
estimated household income inequality whereas financial development is proxied with financial 
depth (money supply and liquid liabilities), financial efficiency (at banking and financial system 
levels), financial activity (from banking and financial system perspectives) and financial size. 
The findings show that with the exception of foreign investment, financial dynamics of depth, 
efficiency, activity and size enhance equalizing income-distribution through domestic, private 
and public investment channels. Policy implications are discussed with particular emphasis on 
improving inclusive development for the post-2015 sustainable development agenda. Notably, in 
the current transition from Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), mobilizing domestic resources for investment purposes may have greater 
inclusive benefits than overly reliance on foreign sources of capital. 
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1. Introduction 
 At least three reasons motivate the positioning of an inquiry on the relationship between 
inequality, finance and pro-poor investment in Africa, notably:  the need for investment to 
finance the continent’s growing ambitions; surplus liquidity issues in African financial 
institutions and exclusive development on the continent. First, the African business literature is 
consistent with the position that, the need for investment is one of Africa’s most important 
development challenges (see Ndikumana, 2002; Bartels et al., 2009; Tuomi, 2011; Darley, 2012; 
Asongu, 2012). Second, the highlighted need for investment starkly contrasts with the 
substantially documented issues of surplus liquidity in African financial institutions (Saxegaard, 
2006; Owoundi, 2009; Asongu, 2014ab). Third, an April 2015 World Bank report on attainment 
of the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) poverty target has revealed that extreme poverty 
has been decreasing in all regions of the world with the exception of Africa (World Bank, 2015). 
This is despite the continent enjoying over two decades of growth resurgence (Fosu, 2015a, p. 
44), and hosting about seven of the ten fastest growing economies in the world.  
 The present line of inquiry accounts for the three highlighted concerns by assessing pro-
poor investment channels contingent on financial development.  The positioning steers clear of 
recent inclusive development literature which has essentially focused on, inter alia: correlates of 
poverty (Anyanwu, 2013a, 2014a); reinventing foreign aid for inclusive and sustainable 
development, increasing employment and mitigating poverty (Asongu, 2015a; Fields, 2015;  
Simpasa et al., 2015; Page & Shimeles, 2015; Jones et al., 2015; Jones & Tarp, 2015; Page & 
Söderbom, 2015); shifting development paradigms from ‘strong economics’ to ‘soft economics’ 
in order to elicit  exclusive development in Africa with a human capability approach (Kuada, 
2015); elucidating myths surrounding Africa’s growth resurgence (Fosu, 2015bc); gender 
inequality (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2007; Baliamoune-Lutz, & McGillivray, 2009; Elu & Loubert, 
2013; Anyanwu, 2013b, 2014b); recent advances in finance for inclusive and sustainable 
development (Asongu & De Moor, 2015); debates between absolute pro-poor growth (Ravallion 
& Chen, 2003) versus relative pro-poor growth (Dollar & Kraay, 2002, 2003); recent growth 
measurements for inclusive development (Anand et al., 2013; Mlachila et al., 2014); nexuses 
between inequality, growth and poverty (Fosu, 2010abc, 2011) and inclusive human 
development from globalization-driven aggregated investment (Asongu, 2013a) and debts 
(Asongu et al., 2015). The last two streams are closest to this inquiry.  
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 Macroeconomic literature on the relationship between finance and inequality has been 
limited because of constraints in data availability on income inequality. Unfortunately, the 
stream of literature on the finance-inequality nexus has three main shortcomings (see Asongu, 
2013a), notably: the limited use of financial development concepts; failure to account for 
concerns about surplus liquidity in African financial institutions and the need to model the 
relationship with other relevant variables. First, financial development concepts in the finance-
inequality literature have been limited to the notions of activity (Batuo et al., 2010) and depth 
(Kai & Hamori, 2009; Batuo et al., 2010). Moreover, it is important to clarify the financial depth 
concept because financial depth in the perspective of money supply is not equal to liquid 
liabilities in every development context. This is essentially because a great chunk of the 
monetary base in African countries circulates outside the formal banking system (Asongu, 
2013b). Second, the employed variables of financial depth and activity fail to account for the 
ability banks to transform mobilised deposits (financial depth) into credit (financial activity) for 
economic operators. Integrating this missing financial allocation efficiency dimension is 
essential to understanding how addressing the substantially documented issues of surplus 
liquidity in African financial institutions, affects the policy syndrome of exclusive development.  
Third, there is an evolving stream of literature assessing how inequality is fuelled by the 
interaction of macroeconomic and institutional variables, notably: the hypothesis of Azzimonti et 
al. (2014) on globalisation-driven debts fuelling inequality. The underlying hypothesis has been 
recently confirmed in Africa (Asongu et al., 2015). We extend this stream of literature by 
assessing how investment-driven finance affects inequality on the continent. The link between 
the investigated relationship and theoretical underpinnings of Azzimonti et al. (2014) build on 
the evidence that in the 1980s and 1990s, most African countries embarked on a series of 
globalization-driven structural and policy adjustments in the financial sector which 
fundamentally had as goal to stimulate investment for economic growth and inclusive 
development (Janine & Elbadawi, 1992; Batuo & Asongu, 2015). The investigation of how 
finance affects income-inequality through investment channels aligns with foremost literature on 
the: (i) close connection between the level of investment and economic growth (Barro, 1991; 
Ben-David, 1998) and (ii) pervasiveness of financial repression in stifling economic growth 
(McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973).  
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The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews existing literature. The 
data and methodology are engaged in Section 3. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical 
results while Section 5 concludes with implications.  
 
2. Finance, investment and inequality: theory and evidence  
 This section is discussed in four main strands, namely: theoretical highlights; the nexus 
between inequality and finance; the relevance of inequality in financial access and the experience 
and lessons of financial reforms.  
 In the first strand, whereas we have already highlighted the Azzimonti et al. (2014) 
theoretical underpinnings on globalization-driven debts as a source of inequality, it is also 
important to discuss more foremost theoretical underpinnings on the relationship between 
finance and inequality. There are two main contrasting views on the finance-inequality 
relationship. The first maintains an inverted U-shape link between financial development and 
inequality. Within this framework, the Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) finding on the finance-
growth-inequality nexus predicts a Kuznets relationship between finance and inequality. In other 
words, in the early stages of development when the financial sector is underdeveloped, inequality 
augments with financial development. However, this disequalizing impact reduces as the 
economy develops; progressing to the intermediate phase and then to the mature phase of 
development where, agents are likely to see their incomes increase as they gain access to the 
financial intermediary sector. Hence, in the transition from a primitive slow-growing economy to 
a developed fast-growing one, a nation passes via a stage in which the distribution of wealth 
across the rich and poor stretches.  
Beside the recently documented evidence of globalisation (Asongu et al., 2015) and 
liberalisation policies (Batuo & Asongu, 2015) as sources of inequality in African countries, 
sociological and cultural factors have also been used to elicit inequality on the continent. Some 
contemporary African development studies that have focused on this direction have articulated, 
inter alia: ethnicity (Elu & Loubert, 2013); gender (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2007; Baliamoune-Lutz, 
& McGillivray, 2009; Anyanwu, 2013b, 2014b) and low human capital (Kuada, 2015). 
 The second perspective presents a linear relationship between financial development and 
income-inequality (see Banerjee & Newman, 1993; Galor & Zeira, 1993). The basic theoretical 
assumption here is that financial market imperfections such as financial asymmetries, credit 
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histories, transaction and contract enforcement costs could be very binding on the poor who lack 
collaterals and relational networks. Therefore, even when the poor have projects with high 
returns, they may still be credit-rationed, which infringes on the efficiency of capital allocation 
and limits the social mobility of the poor. Under these scenarios, income-inequality rises with 
financial development. Conversely, improvements in capital allocation efficiency would reduce 
income inequality by facilitating funding to poor individuals who have productive investments.  
 In the second strand, the empirical evidence between finance and inequality can be 
briefly discussed in three main points. The first investigates the link between financial 
development, growth and inequality. Undernourishment (Claessens & Feijen, 2006) and a 
population with lower income (Beck et al., 2007) decrease with financial development. A 
relevant characteristic in this category is the debate over the benefits of financial development. 
Some authors maintain that financial imperfections such as information and transaction costs are 
binding on the poor (who lack collaterals and credit histories) and thus a relaxation of these 
credit constraints will disproportionately benefit the poor. It follows that improvements in capital 
allocation efficiency is very likely to reduce income-inequality by facilitating funding to poor 
individuals who have productive investments (Galor & Zeira, 1993; Aghion & Bolton, 1997; 
Galor & Moay, 2004). On the contrary, some authors have also concluded that financial 
development primarily helps the rich. This is the case when financial development is not pro-
poor at the early stages of development (see Greenwood & Javanovic, 1990). 
Studies on the finance-inequality nexus are relatively scarce within the context of Africa 
due to lack of relevant data on inequality. In a first detailed econometric analysis, Kai and 
Hamori (2009) examine the link between financial deepening and inequality in sub-Saharan 
Africa for the period 1980 and 2002 to establish that financial depth mitigates inequality.  
 Batuo et al. (2010) investigate how financial development is related to income 
distribution in a panel of 22 African countries for the period 1990-2004 to conclude that income 
inequality decreases financial sector development. They are consistent with the bulk of 
theoretical (Galor & Zeira, 1993; Banerjee & Newman, 1993) and empirical (Beck et al., 2004; 
Beck et al., 2007; Kai & Hamori, 2009) literature which has failed to confirm the Greenwood-
Javanovic (1990) hypothesis of an inverted U-Shaped relationship between financial 
development and inequality. Asongu (2013a) has examined how investment affects income 
distribution through financial channels to conclude that with the exception of financial 
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efficiency, financial mechanisms of activity and depth are pro-poor whereas financial size as a 
mechanism is not significant.  
 The second point consists of literature that has focused on unequal access to and usage of 
finance. Whereas in developed countries, more than 90% of households gain access to financial 
services,  access to retail banking services is minimal in the poorer segments of the population in 
undeveloped countries, with fewer than one-quarter of households having access to basic 
banking services (Honohan, 2006). The narrative is consistent with recent evidence from Asongu 
(2015b) which suggest that, of adults living on less than 2USD/day in the world, only 23% 
possess bank accounts, most of whom are in developing countries.  Low usage of finance in 
lower-income countries is partly traceable to low banking sector outreach. With regard to the 
second dimension on financial access, it is important to distinguish between financial depth and 
access to finance. As emphasized by Claessens and Perotti (2007), numbers on the size of loans 
and deposits per capita are substantially higher in lower income countries compared to their 
higher income counterparts. This implies that in low income countries, for the most part, usage 
of formal banking services is restricted to firms and comparatively rich households. 
 The third point focuses on the effects of inequality in access to finance. Absence of equal 
opportunities in access to finance may: (i) prompt corruption (Berger & Udell, 1998); (ii) slow-
down the growth of firms (Ayyagari et al., 2006; Beck et al., 2005); (iii) decrease entrepreneurial 
activities and convergence in growth rates between rich and poor countries (Banerjee & Duflo, 
2005) and (iv) diminish individual welfare gains such as reduction in the prevalence of hunger, 
poor health, low education and gender income-inequality (Claessens & Feijen, 2007).  
 From the discussed theoretical and empirical evidence, financial access is quite skewed 
and affects competition, individual welfare and enterprise growth. Hence, lack of equal access to 
finance can undermine growth, reduce welfare and create vulnerabilities during financial crises. 
In the third strand that follows, the engaged concerns are discussed in light natural economic and 
political perspectives.  
 In the third strand on possible reasons for inequality in access to finance, we briefly 
discuss economic and political factors. On the one hand, natural economic reasons include high 
fixed cost in offering financial services and barriers created by entry regulations that serve a 
valid public good (e.g. identification requirements for opening-up a bank account to maintain 
financial integrity). It is as a result of financial market frictions that the poor cannot invest in 
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their education despite their high marginal productivity of investment (Galor & Zeira, 1993; 
Banerjee & Newman, 1993). On the other hand, unequal access could be the result of political 
influence which creates regulatory obstacles to protect established rents (Rajan & Zingales, 
2003; Acemoglu et al., 2005). This means countries with poor political institutions are associated 
with unequal political influence. Within this framework, powerful groups will affect the 
regulatory and judicial environments as well as frequently control the allocation of finance 
directly through bank ownership or via political networking. 
 The fourth strand discusses the experience of and lessons from financial reforms in three 
main points. The first presents studies that have focused on the timing and experience of 
financial liberalization in developing and developed countries over the past two decades (Henry, 
2003; Chinn & Ito, 2006). Evidence is provided, especially at the individual firm level that 
domestic deregulation and liberalization have, inter alia:  increased the supply of domestic 
capital, attracted foreign capital and led to more relaxed financial constraints. These have 
substantially contributed to increasing investment and boosting economic growth. Moreover, on 
average terms, the liberalization of capital markets has promoted growth, efficiency and asset 
allocation (Levine & Zervros, 1996; Henry, 2000ab, 2006).  
 The second point concerns literature that is linked to asset allocation, rents and economic 
growth opportunities. Within this framework, some studies are consistent on the view that 
financial and economic reforms have for the most part benefited insiders through the highlighted 
mechanisms, namely: rents, opportunities of growth and preferential allocation of assets. Notable 
country-specific examples documenting how the privatization of state-owned banks benefits 
groups of insiders include: Chile in the 1970s (see  Velasco, 1988; Valdes-Prieto, 1992); Mexico 
in the 1980s (see Haber & Kantor, 2004; La Porta et al., 2003; Haber et al., 2003) and Russia in 
the 1990s (see  Claessens & Pohl, 1995; Perotti, 2002). Other findings supporting this narrative 
include: preferential allocation of licenses to a selected few insiders (Clarke et al., 2003); 
benefits from stock market liberalization skewed to the top quantile  of the income distribution 
(Das & Mohapatra, 2003); corporate governance rules designed to profit insiders (Khwaja & 
Mian, 2005); poor regulation and weak enforcement of rules in liberalized markets avail insiders 
with room for expropriating minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000; Claessens et al., 2002) 
and financial openness increasing investment and capital allocation at the micro level (see 
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Henry, 2003) without a corresponding translation into higher economic growth at the macro 
level.  
 The third point briefly engages the literature on allocation risk resulting from financial 
reforms. Within this framework, a banking crisis increases inequality (see Galbraith & Lu, 1999) 
typically because a financial crisis can be socialized (Dooley, 2000). Conversely, financial crises 
that are associated with remarkable uncontrolled social unrest can also benefit the poor through 
looting activities (Akerlof & Romer, 1993). On the redistributive impact of crisis through 
politics, Glaeser et al. (2003) argue that in many countries, the political answer to institutional 
subversion by the rich is not institutional reform, but rather a form of massive Robin Hood 
redistribution. In some circumstances, this backlash slows economic and social progress on the 
one hand and on the other hand, the effect could simply be a change in the elite. In many cases, 
reforms are often opportunistic, geared towards political ends; most notably during elections 
(Dinc, 2004; Brown & Dinc, 2004).  
This study complements existing literature by investigating how investment-driven 
finance affects inequality in Africa. The main reasons justifying the positioning of this inquiry 
have been substantially engaged in the introduction notably:  the need for investment to finance 
the continent’s growing ambitions; surplus liquidity issues in African financial institutions and 
exclusive development on the continent. The corresponding hypothesis that the empirical section 
is devoted to testing is: finance-driven investment is pro-poor. However, the pro-poor linkage 
may depend on the adopted aggregate investment channel.  
 
3.  Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
We examine a sample of thirteen African countries for which inequality data is available, 
namely: Algeria, Botswana, Cameroon, Egypt, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco, Senegal, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania and Uganda. Financial development and other 
macroeconomic indicators are respectively from the Financial Development and Structure 
Database (FDSD) and African Development Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank.  
Due to scarcity in inequality data (e.g. the GINI coefficient) from ADI of the World 
Bank, we are consistent with recent inclusive development literature (see Kai & Hamori, 2009; 
Asongu, 2013a) in using the estimated household income inequality data obtained from the 
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University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP). Hence, sampled countries are those for which 
data is available from the UTIP and which have not experienced a civil war during the period 
1980-2002. The periodicity also coincides with the two decades of structural adjustment and 
policy reforms on the African continent. The variables as summarized in Appendix 3 could be 
classified into the following categories. 
Four main financial development variables are used, namely, dynamics in: depth, 
efficiency, activity and size. First, financial depth is measured from both money supply and 
liquid liability perspectives. The former represents the monetary base plus demand, saving and 
time deposits, while the latter denotes financial system deposits. The two indicators are in ratios 
of GDP (see Appendix 3) and should robustly check each other as either account for over 97% of 
information in the other (see Appendix 2). Second, financial allocation efficiency is defined as 
the ability to transform mobilized financial system deposits into credit for economic operators. It 
is measured as the ratio of: (i) ‘bank credit’ to ‘bank deposits’ for banking system efficiency and 
(ii) ‘financial system credit’ to ‘financial system deposits’ for financial system efficiency (see 
Asongu, 2013c). These two financial allocation efficiency proxies can check each other as either 
represent more than 88% of variability in one another (see Appendix 2). Third, financial activity 
refers to the ability of banks to grant credit to economic operators. It is measured with ‘private 
domestic credit by deposit banks’ and ‘private credit by domestic banks and other financial 
institutions’ for banking system activity and financial system activity respectively.  For the 
purpose of robustness, the latter measure can also be used to check the former because it 
represents more than 91% of information in the former (see Appendix 2). Fourth, consistent with 
the FDSD (see Beck et al., 1999) and recent financial development literature (Asongu, 2012bc), 
financial size is measured as the ratio of ‘deposit bank assets’ to ‘total assets’ (deposit bank 
assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets: Dbacba).  
The above financial development indicators are consistent with  theoretical concepts in 
the FDSD (Beck et al., 1999) and recent empirical applications, notably: studies clearly 
articulating the concepts of financial depth, efficiency, activity and size in titles (e.g. Asongu, 
2013d) or employing them on the basis of a consensus on their relevance in existing literature 
(Asongu, 2013e).   
 Four aggregate investment variables are employed as channels, namely: Gross Domestic 
Investment, Foreign Direct Investment, Gross Public Investment and Gross Private Investment. 
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The choice of these variables is consistent with Asongu (2013a) who has employed them as 
instruments in the finance-inequality relationship.  In accordance with the finance-growth 
(Levine & King, 1993; Hassan et al., 2011) and finance-inequality (Dollar & Kraay; Beck et al., 
2007; Kai & Hamori, 2009) literature, we control for trade, population growth, government 
expenditure and GDP growth. We discuss the signs of control variables concurrently with 
estimated results.  
 The descriptive statistics and correlation matrix are presented in Appendix 1 and 
Appendix 2 respectively. It is apparent from the summary statistics that: the variables are quite 
comparable from mean values and from corresponding variations or standard deviations, we can 
be confident that reasonable estimated linkages would emerge. The purpose of the correlation 
matrix is to:  avoid concerns of multicollinearity and provide some insights into expected 
relationships. First, we notice that concerns about multicollinearity which are highlighted in bold 
are exclusively among financial development variables, with the slight exception of the 
correlation between Gross Domestic Investment and Gross Private Investment. Hence, 
specifications in the Two-Stage regressions are tailored to avoid entering these investment 
variables into the same equation. Moreover, baseline regressions that are employed to test the 
strength of the instruments are also tailored to avoid concerns of multicollinearity as much as 
possible. Another objective of the correlation matrix is to inform the study about potential 
linkages between household inequality and other variables. We notice that with the exception of 
population growth which is positively correlated with the dependent variable, other variables are 
negatively correlated with inequality. The positive correlation with population growth is 
traceable to the fact that poor households mostly account for a substantial part of population 
growth because they often prefer quantity to quality of children. Moreover, everything being 
equal, an additional child has a higher diminishing impact on household per capita income in 
poorer households. Corresponding negative correlations are in accordance with theory in the 
perspective that financial sector reforms (in depth, efficiency, activity and size) are designed to 
reduce income-inequality through aggregate investments (domestic, foreign, private and public).  
 
3.2 Methodology 
The methodology is discussed in three strands, notably: endogeneity, estimation 
procedure and robustness checks.  On the first strand on endogeneity, although the lack of 
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financial access has long been recognized as the leading cause of persisting inequality, Claessens 
and Perotti (2007) have emphasized the need to recognize the reverse effect as well. They are 
consistent with Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) in highlighting that inequality affects financial 
development and in particular the ‘distribution of access’ because unequal access to resources 
affects de facto political power. In accordance with the literature (Rajan & Zingales, 2003; 
Perotti & Volpin, 2007) in a weak institutional framework where de facto political influence 
dominates de jure political representation, inequality renders it easy for established interests to 
influence access to finance by direct control or regulatory capture of the financial system.  
On the second strand, the study is consistent with Beck et al. (2003) in employing a Two-
Stage-Least Squares (2SLS) estimation technique with financial dynamics as instrumental 
variables. In light of the endogeneity concern raised in the preceding paragraph, the paper 
requires an estimation technique that takes account of endogeneity. The Instrumental Variable 
(IV) estimator can avoid the bias that Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates suffer-from 
(absence of consistency) when independent variables are correlated with the error term in the 
equation of interest. Another appeal worth articulating is the close connection between 
investment and finance in the effects of financial reforms, which provides another justification 
for the use of financial dynamics as instrumental variables. Thus the IV model assesses if 
financial dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size affect income-inequality through 
domestic, foreign, private and public investment channels.  
The adopted 2SLS procedure consists of the following steps: (i) justify the use of a 2SLS 
over an OLS estimation technique with the Hausman-test for endogeneity; (ii) show that 
instrumental variables (financial intermediary dynamics) are exogenous to the endogenous 
components of explaining variables (investment channels), conditional on other covariates 
(control variables) and (iii) verify if the financial instruments are valid and not correlated with 
the error-term in the equation of interest with an Over-identifying restrictions (OIR) test.  
 Thus the above methodology will include the following regressions. 
First-stage regression:  
 itit FinDepthChannelInvestment )(10  itncyFinEfficie )(2 ityFinactivit )(3                         
                               itFinsize)(4   itiX                                                                              (1) 
Second-stage regression: 
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 itit ChannelInvestmentInequality )(10  itiX                                                           (2)                                            
  
In the two equations, X is a set of independent variables that are included in first-stage 
regressions. For the first and second equations,  v  and u, respectively represent the error terms. 
Instrumental variables are the four financial intermediary dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity 
and size.  
 In the third strand, robustness of the results are ensured by: (i) using  Heteroscedasticity 
and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard error regressions; (ii) controlling for the 
consistency of financial channels with alternative instrumental indicators and (iii) employing 
restricted and unrestricted regressions.  
 
4. Empirical Analysis  
This section presents results from cross-country regressions to assess the: (i) importance 
of financial dynamics in explaining cross-country variations in income-inequality; (ii) ability of 
financial dynamics to explain cross-country differences in aggregate investments and (iii) ability 
of the exogenous components of investment to account for cross-country differences in income 
distribution. 
 
4.1 Inequality and Finance 
 In Table 1, we regress the estimated household income inequality indicator on financial 
intermediary dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size and also test for their joint 
significance. We avoid simultaneous involvement of financial aspects of depth and activity in the 
same regression in order to limit concerns of multicollinearity. With the exception of financial 
size, the use of alternative indicators in each financial channel provides a robust account of the 
validity in ‘significances and signs’ of estimated coefficients. The results in Table 1 show that 
distinguishing countries by financial dynamics helps explain cross-country differences in 
income-inequality. These findings have been documented by an extensive literature (Beck et al., 
2004; Beck et al., 2007; Kai & Hamori, 2009; Batuo et al., 2010). Even after controlling for 
population growth and GDP growth, financial intermediary dynamics jointly enter into all 
regressions significantly (see third to the last line of Table 1 on significance of the Fisher-test). 
At least judging from empirical literature, we expected negative signs for the channels of 
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financial depth (Kai & Hamori, 2009; Batuo et al., 2010) and financial activity (Beck et al., 
2004; Beck et al., 2007; Batuo et al., 2010). As for financial efficiency and size, we cannot 
firmly establish with certainty the right signs because to the best of our knowledge previous 
studies have not modelled the finance-inequality relationship in this light. However, based on the 
correlation analysis discussed earlier, we expected the coefficients to display negative signs.  
Population growth and GDP growth have the expected positive and negative signs respectively.  
 
Table 1: Inequality and Finance regressions  
  Dependent Variable: Estimated Household  Income Inequality  
   Mod. 1 Mod.1* Mod.2 Mod.2* Mod.3 Mod.3* Mod.4 Mod.4* 
  Constant 48.88*** 47.16*** 43.47*** 43.93*** 45.86*** 44.53*** 40.37*** 40.50*** 
   (38.15) (37.94) (32.92) (31.78) (23.18) (22.66) (21.66) (20.80) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instruments 
 
Financial 
Depth 
Monetary 
Base 
-13.2*** --- --- --- -12.4*** --- --- --- 
(-7.828)    (-7.130)    
Liquid 
liabilities 
--- -13.9*** --- --- --- -12.7*** --- --- 
 (-6.815)    (-5.938)   
 
Financial 
Efficiency 
Banking S. 
Efficiency 
-2.68*** --- 2.148** --- -3.40***  1.100 --- 
(-3.039)  (2.359)  (-3.717)  (1.149)  
Financial S. 
Efficiency  
--- -1.282* --- 2.806*** --- -1.692** --- 1.862* 
 (-1.829)  (3.009)  (-2.335)  (1.900) 
 
Financial 
Activity 
Banking S. 
Activity 
--- --- -19.5*** --- --- --- -18.4***  
  (-7.286)    (-6.76) -9.087*** 
Financial S. 
Activity 
--- --- --- -10.4*** --- --- --- (-4.169) 
   (-4.888)     
Financial 
Size 
Dbacba 4.885** 4.92** 6.175*** 2.216 6.661*** 6.210*** 8.189*** 4.094* 
(2.579) (2.419) (3.028) (1.088) (3.389) (2.971) (3.917) (1.947) 
           
 
 
Control  Variables 
Popg --- --- --- --- 0.968** 0.822** 1.079*** 1.125*** 
     (2.443) (2.024) (2.708) (2.710) 
GDPg --- --- --- --- -0.154* -0.129 -0.173** -0.118 
     (-1.939) (-1.588) (-2.132) (-1.396) 
Fisher  test  20.83*** 15.87*** 18.06*** 8.32*** 14.49*** 10.75*** 13.41*** 6.90*** 
Adjusted R²  0.219 0.171 0.196 0.092 0.243 0.186 0.229 0.121 
Number of  Observations  213 216 211 216 211 214 209 214 
Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on Central bank assets plus Deposit bank assets. Popg: Population growth rate. GDPg: GDP growth rate. *,**,***: 
significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Mod: Model. S:system.  
 
 
4.2 Investment and Finance 
 Table 2 assesses whether financial dynamics explain cross-country differences in the 
indicators which characterize the investment channel. We regress proxies of domestic, foreign, 
private and public investments on the financial instrumental dynamic variables. While Panel A is 
concerned with domestic and foreign investments, Panel B focuses on private and public 
investments. We report the Fisher-test of whether the instruments taken together significantly 
explain cross-country variations in the investment channels. Clearly, financial dynamics help 
explain cross-country variations in the investment channels, as the F-test for the joint 
significance of these instruments is significant at the 1% level in all regressions.  
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Table 2: First-Stage Investment-Finance regressions  
  Panel  A: Domestic and Foreign Investments 
   Domestic Investment Foreign Investment 
   Mod.5 Mod.5* Mod.6 Mod.6* Mod.7 Mod.7* Mod.8 Mod.8* 
  Constant 8.790*** 10.13*** 11.08*** 10.65*** 0.701 0.333 0.471 -0.032 
   (3.883) (4.576) (5.575) (5.446) (1.458) (0.733) (0.991 (-0.050) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instruments 
 
Financial 
Depth 
Monetary 
Base 
13.29*** --- --- --- -1.37** --- --- --- 
(7.216)    (-2.31)    
Liquid 
liabilities 
--- 13.04*** --- --- --- -1.76** --- --- 
 (5.859)    (-2.51)   
 
Financial 
Efficiency 
Banking S. 
Efficiency 
-1.481 --- -4.70*** --- -1.21*** --- -0.89** --- 
(-1.499)  (-4.534)  (-3.388)  (-2.55)  
Financial S. 
Efficiency  
--- -3.09*** --- -6.12*** --- -0.89*** --- -0.969*** 
 (-3.924)  (-6.165)  (-3.029)  (-2.88) 
 
Financial 
Activity 
Banking S. 
Activity 
--- --- 12.05*** --- ---- --- -2.31** --- 
  (4.338)    (-2.44)  
Financial S. 
Activity 
--- --- --- 7.518*** --- --- --- -1.23* 
   (3.410)    (-1.661) 
Financial 
Size 
Dbacba  7.520*** 9.333*** 5.59** 8.800*** 1.262 1.653* 1.63* 2.77*** 
(3.493) (4.268) (2.538) (4.262) (1.463) (1.790) (1.75) (3.948) 
           
 
 
 
 
     Control  Variables  
Trade --- --- --- --- 0.010*** 0.009** 0.012*** --- 
     (2.615) (2.267) (2.983)  
G.E --- --- 0.393*** 0.439*** --- --- --- 0.028 
   (3.782) (4.289)    (0.821) 
Popg 0.832* 0.899* --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (1.816) (1.963)       
GDPg 0.255*** 0.192** 0.286*** 0.220** 0.106*** 0.102*** --- --- 
 (2.797) (2.120) (3.020) (2.412) (3.532) (3.438)   
Fisher test  20.35*** 19.03*** 16.20*** 18.62*** 12.88*** 12.368*** 12.28*** 7.674*** 
Adjusted R²  0.277 0.261 0.233 0.256 0.200 0.191 0.159 0.099 
Number of  Observations  253 256 251 256 238 241 238 243 
           
  Panel  B: Private and Public Investments 
   Private Investment Public Investment 
   Mod. 9 Mod. 9* Mod.10 Mod.10* Mod. 11 Mod.11* Mod. 12 Mod.12* 
  Constant 4.684*** 5.831*** 6.362*** 6.676*** 6.165*** 6.253*** 9.265*** 7.923*** 
   (3.626) (4.683) (4.911) (5.101) (4.284) (4.414) (7.084) (5.193) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instruments  
 
Financial 
Depth 
Monetary 
Base 
4.082*** --- --- --- 7.819*** --- --- --- 
(2.611)    (6.495)    
Liquid 
liabilities 
--- 3.194* --- --- --- 7.646*** --- --- 
 (1.728)    (5.374)   
 
Financial 
Efficiency 
Banking S. 
Efficiency 
1.563* --- 0.091 --- -0.898 --- -2.764*** --- 
(1.865)  (0.107)  (-1.493)  (-4.159)  
Financial S. 
Efficiency  
--- 0.510 --- -0.499 --- -1.58*** --- -3.085*** 
 (0.724)  (-0.588)  (-3.287)  (-4.482) 
 
Financial 
Activity 
Banking S. 
Activity 
--- --- 7.01*** --- --- --- 6.852*** --- 
  (2.993)    (3.848)  
Financial S. 
Activity 
--- --- --- 2.840 --- --- --- 3.928*** 
   (1.471)    (2.612) 
Financial 
Size 
Dbacba  5.57*** 6.383*** 4.625** 6.753*** -3.92*** -2.626* -3.822** -1.733 
(2.584) (2.754) (2.057) (2.951) (-2.798) (-1.842) (-2.578) (-1.156) 
           
 
 
 
Control Variables  
Trade 0.025** 0.020** 0.026*** 0.020* --- --- --- --- 
 (2.498) (1.973) (2.640) (1.947)     
G.E --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.059 0.078 
       (0.884) (1.140) 
Popg --- --- --- --- 0.407 0.473* --- 0.120 
     (1.430) (1.660)  (0.399) 
GDPg --- --- --- --- ---  -0.046 --- 
       (-0.764)  
Fisher test  13.49*** 11.38*** 14.25*** 11.14*** 13.44*** 11.58*** 5.414*** 5.035*** 
Adjusted R²  0.167 0.141 0.176 0.138 0.169 0.146 0.083 0.075 
Number of  Observations  250 253 248 253 245 248 242 248 
Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on Central bank assets plus Deposit bank assets. Popg: Population growth rate. GDPg: GDP growth rate. G.E: 
Government Expenditure. *,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Mod: Model. S: system. 
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It is worth noting that this is the first-step of the 2SLS approach where, the instruments 
must be exogenous to the endogenous components of the investment channels, conditional on 
other covariates (control variables). The signs of estimated coefficients are broadly consistent 
with recent African literature on the finance-development nexus (Asongu, 2014cd). All 
significant control variables also have the right signs. In essence, there is some consensus in the 
literature on the view that trade openness is associated with higher levels of financial 
development (see Do & Levchenko, 2004; Huang & Temple, 2005). 
 
4.3 Restricted 2SLS regressions 
 
Table 3 addresses two main issues, notably: (i) whether the exogenous components of 
investment channels explain income-inequality conditional on financial dynamics and (ii) if  
financial dynamics explain income-inequality beyond  investment channels. To make these 
investigations we use the 2SLS regressions with financial instrumental variables. Thus we 
integrate Equation (2) into the first-stage regressions (first equation). Whereas the first issue is 
addressed by the significance of estimated coefficients, the second is investigated by the 
overidentifying restrictions (OIR) test whose null hypothesis is the position that the instruments 
(financial channels) are not correlated with the error term of the equation of interest (Equation 
2). Therefore, a rejection of the null hypothesis of the OIR test is a rejection of the position that 
financial dynamics explain income-inequality only through investment channels.  Robustness 
checks are done at three stages, namely the: (i) use of alternative indicators of each financial 
instrumental dynamic as apparent in the last two columns of Tables 3 and 4; (ii) application of 
alternative models with Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) Standard 
Errors captured by models with the “*” indication and (iii) introduction of an (a) autonomous 
(constant) investment measure in the regressions when the OIR test rejects its null hypothesis. 
Table 3 reveals restricted 2SLS inequality regressions. We first justify our choice of a 
2SLS estimation method with a Hausman test. The null hypothesis of this test is the view that 
estimated coefficients by OLS are consistent. In other words, they do not suffer from 
endogeneity because the exogenous variables in the equation of interest are not correlated with 
the error term. Should  the Hausman test fail to reject the null hypothesis (absence of 
endogeneity) we do not consider  the 2SLS estimation method appropriate because estimates by 
OLS are efficient and consistent. With OLS, we find strong evidence of endogeneity in all eight 
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regressions. Conditional on the nature of identification (difference between instruments and 
endogenous regressors) we report the weak instrument test of first-stage regressions with Cragg-
Donald statistics. Given concerns about multicollineatity we do not simultaneously use domestic 
and private investments in the same regression.  
 The first issue is addressed by the significance of estimated coefficients corresponding to 
the investment channel. With regard to the second concern, rejection of the null hypothesis of the 
OIR test in all eight regressions shows that financial channels do not explain income-inequality 
only through investment channels. Therefore the instruments are correlated with the error term in 
the equation of interest. In other words, the financial dynamics do not address the concern of 
endogeneity (which affect investment channels). The presence of biased estimates due to 
endogeneity can be further confirmed by the signs of estimated coefficients. At least judging 
from theoretical postulations (Galor & Zeira, 1993; Banerjee & Newman, 1993), empirical 
literature (Beck et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2007; Kai & Hamori, 2009; Batuo et al., 2010) and to 
some extend common-sense, we expect financial dynamics (instruments) to reduce income-
inequality through aggregate investment channels. Indeed this was the vision of first and second 
generation financial reforms in sampled countries.  The findings in Table 3 are also antagonistic 
with our initial expectations from correlation analysis which has revealed that all investment 
channels are negatively correlated with income distribution. Given the invalidity of these 
instruments under a restricted 2SLS hypothesis, we relax the restriction assumption and suppose 
the presence of an (a) autonomous (constant) level of investment. Therefore we replicate the 
regressions in Table 3 with an unrestricted 2SLS approach presented in Table 4.  
 
Table 3: Finance, Inequality and Restricted Investment with HAC 
  Dependent Variable: Estimated Household  Income Inequality 
  Model 13 Model 13* Model 14 Model 14* Model 15 Model 15* Model 16 Model 16* 
 
 
 
Investment 
Channels 
 
Domestic --- --- 1.775*** 1.775*** 1.988*** 1.988*** --- --- 
   (12.26) (4.480) (6.585) (3.321)   
Foreign --- --- 6.488** 6.488*** 6.826** 6.826 9.463*** 9.463 
   (2.342) (0.873) (2.493) (0.949) (3.273) (1.233) 
Private 2.644*** 2.644*** --- --- --- --- 2.188*** 2.188*** 
 (11.15) (13.24)     (6.201) (4.669) 
Public 1.301*** 1.301*** --- --- -0.625 -0.625 1.023 1.023 
 (2.649) (2.717)   (-0.776) (-0.441) (1.559) (0.852) 
 
Hausman test 370.782*** 370.782*** 322.413*** 322.41*** 390.22*** 390.22*** 522.58*** 522.58*** 
OIR(Sargan) test 49.050*** 49.050*** 44.388*** 44.388*** 33.484*** 33.484*** 18.336*** 18.336*** 
P-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Weak Instrument test(F) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Cragg-Donald 12.017 --- 3.106 --- 3.017 --- 4.017  
Adjusted R² 0.156 0.156 0.058 0.058 0.028 0.028 0.020 0.020 
F-Statistics --- --- --- --- 367.62*** 69.718*** 273.38*** 56.220*** 
Observations 202 202 199 199 191 191 191 191 
 18 
         
Instruments  Constant, Money Supply, Banking System activity, Banking system Efficiency, Financial size   
Robustness Instruments Constant, Liquid Liability, Financial System Activity, Financial  System Efficiency, Financial size   
(): z-statistics. Chi-square statistics for Hausman test. LM statistics for Sargan test. [ ]:p-values. Cragg-Donald Weak Instrument test. *, **, ***: 
significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Models with the “*” sign are in Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent(HAC) standard 
errors.  
 
  
4.4 Unrestricted 2SLS regressions 
Consistent with the analytical approach employed for Table 3, Table 4 addresses the two 
main issues. First, rejection of the null hypothesis of the Hausman test in all eight regressions 
validates the 2SLS estimation method. While the significance of estimated coefficients addresses 
the first concern, the second issue is fully addressed by the OIR test in six of the eight 
regressions. Failure to reject its null hypothesis in models 18 to 20 shows that financial channels 
do not explain the redistributive effect of income  beyond aggregate investment mechanisms in 
the presence of autonomous or constant investment. This confirms the channels of instruments 
are valid and the issue of endogeneity is no longer relevant because the instrumental financial 
dynamics are not correlated with the error term in the unrestricted equation of interest. Results 
show that while domestic, public and private investments have a redistributive impact of 
reducing income-inequality, foreign investment does the contrary.  This finding on foreign direct 
investment is consistent with the investment-inequality literature (Pan-Long, 1995; Basu & 
Guariglia, 2007).  In a recent study where foreign direct investment is the proxy for globalization 
(Kai & Hamori, 2009), its disequalizing effect depends on the level of development in the 
country: a conclusion that aligns with some theoretical postulations (see Greenwood & 
Jovanovic , 1990). 
 
Table 4: Finance, Inequality and Unrestricted Investment with HAC 
  Dependent Variable: Estimated Household  Income Inequality 
  Model 17 Model 17* Model 18 Model 18* Model 19 Model 19* Model20 Model 20* 
 Constant 58.682*** 58.682*** 54.429*** 54.429*** 52.449*** 52.449*** 54.697*** 54.697*** 
  (21.68) (12.97) (13.82) (8.928) (12.70) (8.260) (13.23) (9.718) 
 
 
 
Investment 
Channels 
 
Domestic --- --- -0.640*** -0.640** -0.438* -0.438 --- --- 
   (-3.404) (-2.293) (-1.864) (-1.278)   
Foreign --- --- 4.146*** 4.146* 3.926*** 3.926* 2.931*** 2.931** 
   (3.084) (1.849) (3.111) (1.822) (2.788) (2.076) 
Private -0.591*** -0.591** --- --- --- --- -0.553** -0.553* 
 (-3.537) (-2.263)     (-2.343) (-1.830) 
Public -0.902*** -0.902** --- --- -0.307 -0.307 -0.803*** -0.803*** 
 (-4.840) (-2.295)   (-0.840) (-0.640) (-3.190) (-2.861) 
 
Hausman test 14.928*** 14.928*** 48.567*** 48.567*** 49.072*** 49.072*** 39.059*** 39.059*** 
OIR(Sargan) test 16.775 16.775 2.376 2.376 1.952 1.952 2.479 2.479 
P-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.304] [0.304] [0.162] [0.162] [0.115] 0.115] 
Weak Instrument test(F) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Cragg-Donald 11.45 --- 3.869 --- 3.749 --- 3.666 --- 
Adjusted R² 0.160 0.160 0.026 0.026 0.020 0.020 0.059 0.059 
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F-Statistics 15.972*** 4.651** 8.687*** 3.464*** 6.059*** 2.283* 9.038*** 4.592*** 
Observations 202 202 199 199 191 191 191 191 
         
Instruments Constant, Money Supply, Banking System activity, Banking system Efficiency, Financial size 
Robustness Instruments Constant, Liquid Liability, Financial System Activity, Financial  System Efficiency, Financial size 
(): z-statistics. Chi-square statistics for Hausman test. LM statistics for Sargan test. [ ]: p-values. Cragg-Donald Weak Instrument test. *, **, ***: 
significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Models with the “*” sign are in Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard 
errors. 
 
 
5. Concluding implications and further directions 
  
 This study has complemented existing literature by investigating how investment-driven 
finance affects inequality in Africa. The empirical evidence is based on restricted and 
unrestricted Two-Stage Least Squares and a pre-crisis periodicity (1980-2002). Inequality is 
measured with estimated household income inequality whereas financial development is proxied 
with financial depth (money supply and liquid liabilities), financial efficiency (at banking and 
financial system levels), financial activity (from banking and financial system perspectives) and 
financial size. Accordingly, in order to assess the income-redistributive effects of first and 
second generation investment-targeted financial reforms of the 1980s and 1990s respectively, we 
have investigated how financial dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size have affected 
income-inequality through domestic, foreign, private and public investment channels. The 
findings show that with the exception of foreign investment, financial dynamics of depth, 
efficiency, activity and size enhance equalizing income-distribution through domestic, private 
and public investment channels.  
 The equalizing linkages are broadly consistent with theoretical (Galor & Zeira, 1993; 
Banerjee & Newman, 1993) and empirical (Beck et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2007; Kai & Hamori, 
2009; Batuo et al., 2010) literature. The disequalizing effect of foreign investment also aligns 
with theoretical postulations (Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990) because the income-redistributive 
effect of foreign investment may be contingent on country-specific levels of development (Kai & 
Hamori, 2009).  In essence, the hypothesis of an inverted U-shape relationship between foreign 
investment and inequality may be relevant in this context because sampled countries are at their 
early stages of industrialization.  
As a policy implication, financial reforms that target poverty reduction at the early stage 
of development in a country should focus on private, public and domestics investments. 
However as the country matures in terms of economic development,  financial reforms favoring 
globalization by means of foreign direct investment may be  pro-poor. Given that foreign 
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investment is also an indicator of financial globalization (Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2006), the 
conclusions of the study also support the theoretical postulation of Azzimonti et al. (2014) on the 
view that globalization-fuelled debts is a source of inequality: a postulation in developed 
countries that has been confirmed in African countries within the framework of concessional and 
non-concessional debts (Asongu et al., 2015).   
In the current transition from Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), mobilizing domestic resources for investment purposes may have 
greater inclusive benefits than overly reliance on foreign sources of capital. Hence, in view of 
achieving the post-2015 inclusive development objectives, foreign investment policies in the 
sampled countries would need to be tailored towards more inclusive development benefits. These 
may require, among others: an improvement in the legitimacy and credibility of external sources 
of finance on the continent; some insurance that foreign investment benefits the poor; contracts 
by domestic governments and foreign bilateral partners should be mandated by citizens and some 
restraints imposed on the purely capitalistic ideals of foreign investment. Future research devoted 
to improving extant literature could use interviews and focused groups to further assess the 
established linkages.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis Obser. 
Income Inequality(EHII) 45.128 5.140 29.033 64.360 -0.224 0.905 247 
Domestic  Investment(GDI) 21.829 7.069 5.608 43.406 0.399 -0.003 288 
Foreign Investment(FDI) 1.213 2.067 -7.125 10.294 1.338 4.383 275 
Private. Investment(Priv.I) 13.607 5.234 2.303 34.516 0.146 0.301 281 
Public Investment(Pub. I) 6.840 3.900 0.000 22.149 0.825 0.587 276 
Openness(Trade) 69.245 36.366 22.303 205.13 1.409 1.312 289 
Government Expenditure(G.E) 16.101 4.501 6.971 31.554 0.554 0.438 287 
Population growth(Popg) 2.603 0.867 0.670 6.238 0.253 1.673 299 
GDP growth(GDPg) 3.978 4.181 -10.240 19.450 0.109 1.399 286 
Money Supply(M2) 0.377 0.212 0.046 0.830 0.589 -0.836 288 
Liquid Liabilities(Fdgdp) 0.305 0.182 0.026 0.742 0.574 -0.840 286 
Banking   Efficiency(BcBd) 0.766 0.407 0.070 2.259 1.070 1.274 294 
Financial Efficiency(FcFd) 0.855 0.492 0.139 2.606 1.514 2.201 286 
Banking Activity(Pcrb) 0.227 0.167 0.011 0.698 0.975 0.143 281 
Financial Activity (Pcrbof) 0.269 0.238 0.011 1.325 1.996 4.844 288 
Financial Size(Dbacba) 0.741 0.198 0.110 0.999 -0.702 0.238 273 
S.D: Standard  Deviation.  Min : Minimum. Max : Maximum.  Obser : Number of  observations. 
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            Appendix 2: Correlation Matrix  
 
Investment  Variables 
 
Control  Variables 
Instrumental  Variables Income 
Inequality 
 
Fin.  Depth Fin.  Efficiency Fin. Activity F. Size  
GDI FDI Priv.I Pub. I Trade G.E Popg GDPg M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba EHII  
1.000 0.090 0.587 0.430 0.338 0.391 -0.154 0.226 0.402 0.354 -0.074 -0.148 0.225 0.075 0.316 -0.297 GDI 
 1.000 0.089 0.024 0.358 0.057 0.007 0.318 -0.047 -0.060 -0.208 -0.198 -0.158 -0.153 0.123 -0.022 FDI 
  1.000 -0.168 0.313 0.208 -0.217 0.120 0.218 0.200 0.134 0.107 0.296 0.189 0.365 -0.271 Priv. I 
   1.000 0.085 0.210 -0.001 0.055 0.251 0.185 -0.202 -0.270 0.011 -0.125 -0.104 -0.161 Pub. I 
    1.000 0.392 -0.215 0.308 0.026 0.074 -0.072 -0.129 0.001 -0.084 0.502 -0.041 Trade 
     1.000 0.084 0.077 0.017 0.004 0.084 0.132 0.087 0.145 0.271 -0.021 G.E 
      1.000 0.041 -0.420 -0.458 0.096 0.068 -0.286 -0.231 -0.357 0.211 Popg 
       1.000 -0.042 -0.053 -0.195 -0.208 -0.146 -0.170 0.031 -0.041 GDPg 
        1.000 0.976 -0.081 -0.011 0.693 0.563 0.306 -0.413 M2 
         1.000 -0.054 0.052 0.744 0.642 0.391 -0.375 Fdgdp 
          1.000 0.883 0.507 0.455 0.343 -0.060 BcBd 
           1.000 0.621 0.716 0.370 -0.055 FcFd 
            1.000 0.915 0.527 -0.366 Pcrb 
             1.000 0.494 -0.242 Pcrbof 
              1.000 -0.073 Dbacba 
               1.000 EHII 
GDI: Gross Domestic Investment. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. Priv.I: Private Investment. Pub.I: Public Investment. Trade: Openness. G.E: Government Final Expenditure. Popg: Population 
growth rate. GDPg: GDP growth rate. M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. FcFd: Financial system credit on Financial system deposits. Pcrb: Private 
domestic credit by deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on Central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. 
EHII: Estimated Household Income Inequality. Fin: Financial.   
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Appendix 3: Definition of variables  
Variables  Sign Definition of variables  Sources 
Income Inequality  EHII Estimated Household Income Inequality UTIP, Kai and Hamori 
(2009) 
    
Domestic Investment  GDI Gross Domestic Investment (% of GDP) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Foreign Investment FDI Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Private Investment Priv.I Gross Private Investment (% of GDP) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Public Investment  Pub.I Gross Public Investment (% of GDP) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Openness  Trade  Imports(of goods and services) plus 
Exports(of goods and services) on GDP 
World Bank(WDI) 
    
Government Expenditure G.E General Government Final Consumption 
Expenditure (% of GDP) 
World Bank(WDI) 
    
Population growth  Popg Average annual population growth rate  World Bank(WDI) 
    
Growth of GDP GDPg Average annual GDP growth rate World Bank(WDI) 
    
Economic financial 
depth(Money Supply) 
M2 Monetary Base plus demand, saving and 
time deposits  
World Bank(FDSD) 
    
Financial system 
depth(Liquid liabilities) 
Fdgdp Financial system deposits   World Bank(FDSD) 
    
Banking system 
allocation efficiency 
BcBd Bank credit on Bank deposits World Bank(FDSD) 
    
Financial system 
allocation efficiency 
FcFd Financial system credit on Financial 
system deposits  
World Bank(FDSD) 
    
Banking system activity Pcrb Private credit by deposit banks  World Bank(FDSD) 
    
Financial system activity Pcrbof Private credit by deposit banks and other 
financial institutions  
World Bank(FDSD) 
    
Financial size Dbacba Deposit bank assets on Central banks 
assets plus deposit bank assets 
World Bank(FDSD) 
    
GDI: Gross Domestic Investment. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. Priv.I: Private Investment. Pub.I: Public Investment. Trade: Openness. G.E: 
Government Final Expenditure. Popg: Population growth rate. GDPg: GDP growth rate. M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: 
Bank credit on Bank deposits. FcFd: Financial system credit on Financial system deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit by deposit banks. 
Pcrbof: Private domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on Central bank assets plus deposit 
bank assets. EHII: Estimated Household Income Inequality. WDI: World Development Indicators. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure 
Database. UTIP:  University of Texas Inequality Project. 
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